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The Creation of HIPAA Culture: Prioritizing Privacy
Paranoia over Patient Care
INTRODUCTION
A major goal of [HIPAA] is to assure that individuals’ health
information is properly protected while allowing the flow of health
information needed to provide and promote high quality health
care and to protect the public’s health and well being. The Rule
strikes a balance that permits important uses of information, while
protecting the privacy of people who seek care and healing. . . .
[HIPAA] is designed to be flexible and comprehensive to cover the
variety of uses and disclosures that need to be addressed. 1

Every American doctor cannot help but be familiar with HIPAA,
or the “Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,” which
created a national standard for accessing and handling health
information. 2 Under the statute, providers and those who contract
with them—called, respectively, covered entities and business
associates—must protect the privacy and security of patient health
information (“PHI”) and provide patients with access to and certain
rights associated with their individual PHI. 3 Covered entities
traditionally include providers—doctors, clinics, psychologists,
dentists, chiropractors, nursing homes, and pharmacies—and health
plans, including both health insurance companies and government
programs that pay for health care. 4 Business associates contract with
covered entities to care for administrative aspects of providing
healthcare; for example, a covered entity may contract with a
business associate to securely dispose of outdated records. Given the
difficulties associated with safely transmitting PHI between these

1. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 1,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf (last
visited Oct. 1, 2014).
2. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5–42 U.S.C.).
3. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 1, at 1–13.
4. Id. at 2.
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various entities, HIPAA originally sought to ease informationsharing burdens while still providing adequate protection for PHI. 5
Despite these goals, HIPAA privacy laws have “been a common
source of unresolved confusion.” 6 A two-year, $11.5 million privacy
compliance study funded by the Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”), the department tasked with HIPAA enforcement,
found that four years after HIPAA went into effect, covered entities
struggled with understanding and implementing basic concepts in
the statute. 7 Many covered entities have consequently “implemented
business practices in the name of privacy and security that have no
basis in law” in an effort to protect themselves from suffering
HIPAA’s notoriously severe monetary penalties. 8 Whatever the
perplexity surrounding HIPAA “basics,” the statutory penalties, at
least, are well advertised and widely dreaded in the medical
community. 9
This disjointed HIPAA experience—arising from highly
publicized, progressively larger fines 10 and increased auditing, 11 but
not matched by an understanding of how to adequately prevent the
same—has led to heavy overcompensation on preventative measures,
at the expense of best patient care as well as privacy obsession among

5. Id.
6. Posts Categorized as ”HIPPA”, HEALTHBLAWG, http://healthblawg.typepad.com
/healthblawg/HIPAA/page/17/.
7. Linda L. Dimitropoulos, Privacy and Security Solutions for Interoperable Health
Information Exchange: Impact Analysis, RTI INT’L (December 20, 2007), available at http://
www.rti.org/pubs/phase2_impactanaly.pdf.
8. Id.
9. See HIPAA Violations and Enforcement, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn
.org//ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-managing-your-practice/coding-billing-insur
ance/hipaahealth-insurance-portability-accountability-act/hipaa-violations-enforcement.page
(last visited Oct. 1, 2014) [hereinafter AMA HIPAA Violations].
10. With the new Omnibus HIPAA rules, issued January 25, 2013, HHS raised HIPAA
violation penalties. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the
HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5567 (proposed Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 160 and 164) [hereinafter Modifications to HIPAA Rules]; see also Amanda
McGrory-Dixon,
HHS
Toughens
HIPAA
Violation
Penalties,
BENEFITSPRO,
http://www.benefitspro.com/2013/04/09/hhs-toughens-hipaa-violation-penalties
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2014).
11. Are You Ready for a HIPAA Audit?, EY, http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLU
Assets/Be_ready_for_a_HIPAA_audit/$FILE/EY_5_Insights-HIPAA_OCR_AuditMarch_2013.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
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providers and, consequently, their patients. 12 The statute’s murky
standards and tremendous potential for monetary and reputational
penalties has taught the medical community at large to resist and
even fear sharing PHI. Providers are unwilling to share PHI with
one another, and patients have learned to guard their medical
records with similar obstinacy. 13 Scholars, politicians, and medical
experts widely acknowledge the benefits of health-sharing initiatives,
both in terms of monetary savings and enhanced patient care; 14
nevertheless, provider and patient reluctance to transmit PHI has led
to serious difficulty employing new technology aimed at sharing that
data. Such advancements include electronic health record systems,
which are electronically stored medical records, and health
information exchanges (“HIEs”), which are avenues through which
electronic health records can be transmitted between providers.
This Comment will examine the way that HIPAA, as an
expressive law with behavior-altering sanctions, has shaped privacy
culture and PHI-sharing behavior within the medical community,
particularly in relation to the attempted creation of HIEs. Prior
scholarship has discussed how legislation communicates and creates

12. Government publications as well as patient-advocate groups perpetuate this “PHIphobia” and encourage patients to talk to their doctors for more information about privacy
and confidentiality concerns. See, e.g., Protect Your Medical Records, USA.GOV
http://www.usa.gov/topics/family/privacy-protection/medical.shtml (last updated Sept. 3,
2014) (“Talk with your doctor about confidentiality concerns. . . . Read the fine print. Most
authorization forms contain clauses allowing information to be released. You may be able to
restrict some disclosures by revising the form. . . . Be sure to initial and date your revisions. . . .
Register your objections to disclosures that you consider inappropriate. . . . Be cautious when
providing personal information . . . .”); Empowering Consumers. Protecting Privacy, PRIVACY
RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/Medical-Privacy (last visited Oct. 1,
2014) (“Many people consider information about their health to be highly sensitive, deserving
of the strongest protection under the law.”); Judi Hasson, How Private is Your Medical Info?,
AARP (Sept. 17, 2012) http://www.aarp.org/home-family/caregiving/info-09-2012/howprivate-is-your-medical-information.html (“You don’t need to be a celebrity to have valid
concerns that your medical records might be stolen or read by others.”).
13. Are You Ready for a HIPAA Audit?, supra note 11.
14. See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Finding a Cure: The Case for
Regulation and Oversight of Electronic Health Record Systems, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103,
112 (2008) (“These systems could facilitate clinicians’ access to critical patient information and
could prevent medical errors, thereby potentially saving thousands of lives and billions of
dollars.”); Transforming Health Care: The President’s Health Information Technology Plan,
HOUSE,
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/technology
WHITE
/economic_policy200404/chap3.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2014); Kory Mertz, Health
Information Technology 2007 and 2008 State Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 1,
http://www.ncsl.org/print/health/forum/hit_enacted.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
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social values 15 and has also evaluated the confusion surrounding
HIPAA standards. 16 Benefits of electronic health record access are
also widely recognized, 17 but many HIEs have struggled enrolling
sufficient providers to create financially sustainable information
technology structures. 18 This Comment adds to the scholarship by
connecting the two, demonstrating how the HIPAA statute, with its
blurred standards and draconian penalties, has created a privacy
paranoia in patients through their providers that has obstructed
health-enhancing and cost-saving PHI-sharing between consenting
providers. HIPAA, instead of enhancing physician collaboration, has
actually inhibited patient care and cost health care systems hundreds
of millions of dollars. 19 It is the job of lawmakers to change public
perception, to reverse this “PHI paranoia” among providers and
patients, to enhance patient care through appropriately shared and
protected PHI within HIEs, and to fulfill both original goals of

15. See, e.g., Maggie Wittlin, Buckling Under Pressure: An Empirical Test of the
Expressive Effects of Law, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 419, 420 (2011).
16. See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 14 (citing ATL. INFO. SERVS., INC.,
WASHINGTON, D.C., HIPAA COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES: NATIONAL REVIEW OF HIPAA
COMPLIANCE FINDS RAMPANT CONFUSION, MISTAKES, REP. ON PATIENT PRIVACY (2007));
Jenna Phipps, Note, State of Confusion: The HIPPA Privacy Rule and State Physician-Patient
Privilege Laws in Federal Question Cases, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 159 (2007).
17. See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 14.
18. See, e.g., Mathematica Pol’y Res., Harvard Sch. Pub. Health & Robert Wood
Johnson Found., Health Information Technology in the United States: Better Information
Systems
for
Better
Care,
2013,
ROBERT
WOOD
JOHNSON
FOUND.,
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/reports/2013/rwjf406758 (last accessed
Oct. 1, 2014); see also Susan D. Hall, HIEs Still Struggle with Interoperability, Finances,
FIERCE HEALTH IT (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.fiercehealthit.com/story/hies-still-struggleinteroperability-finances/2013-11-08 (“Interoperability issues continue to stifle health
information exchange (HIE) organizations’ ability to connect, and sustainability remains a
struggle . . . .”); Helen Gregg, Seeing Health Information Exchanges as a Community Effort,
BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcareinformation-technology/seeing-health-information-exchanges-as-a-community-effort.html.
19. One study at the Mayo Clinic found that HIPAA implementation cost for the
statutory privacy requirements was $2,734,855. This number did not include lost resources as
a result of implementation, such as repeated testing, diminished communication between
practitioners (and between practitioners and patients), and poor drug-use tracking. Arthur R.
Williams et al., HIPAA Costs and Patient Perceptions of Privacy Safeguards at Mayo Clinic, 34
JOINT COMMISSION J. QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 27, 27 (2008). Similarly, the government
estimates that the cost of updating HIPAA compliance this year “is estimated to be between
$114 million and $225.4 million in the first year of implementation and approximately $14.5
million annually thereafter.” Modifications to HIPAA Rules, supra note 10.
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HIPAA: simultaneously “protecting . . . [patient] privacy” and
“protect[ing] the public’s health and well-being.” 20
Part I of this Comment briefly reviews the history of the HIPAA
statute. Part II examines the theory surrounding law’s expressive
value in shaping culture and decision making. Part III provides an
overview of HIPAA standards, current HIPAA enforcement, and the
importance of privacy standards. Part IV discusses existing HIE
implementation and analyzes the difficulties associated with the
enactment of the Houston HIE, Greater Houston Healthconnect,
resulting from HIPAA’s unintended culture, and briefly reviews
potential solutions. In this part, the experience of the author
working for the Houston HIE illustrates the challenges that the
HIPAA culture presents for successful implementation of HIEs
around the country. Part V concludes.
I. HIPAA HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF ELECTRONIC HEALTH
RECORD SYSTEMS
The evolution of the HIPAA statute provides a framework for
evaluating HIPAA culture. This brief overview moves
chronologically through the creation and implementation of the
HIPAA statute.
Early efforts to regulate and protect electronic PHI transmission
were unsuccessful, 21 and initial legislative attempts to construct
privacy regulations were also unsuccessful. For example, the
“Medical Records Confidentiality Act of 1995” (S. 1360), a bill
designed to provide Americans with greater control over their PHI,
to standardize PHI protection and handling, and “[t]o ensure
personal privacy with respect to medical records and health carerelated information,” 22 did not pass. 23
20. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 1.
21. During the administration of George H.W. Bush, HHS consulted with healthcare
industry leaders in order to create an electronic data exchange. HHS Secretary Dr. Louis W.
Sullivan teamed up with Bernard R. Tresnowski, president of the Blue Cross Blue Shield
Associations, and Joseph T. Brophy, the former president of The Travelers Insurance
Company, to build the Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange to create a national
electronic health record system and cut healthcare costs. They failed to finish this project
before Bush lost reelection, but the Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange became a
player in future healthcare legislation. STEVE BASS ET AL., HIPAA COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS
12–13 (2002).
22. Medical Records Confidentiality Act of 1995, S. 1360, 104th Cong. (1995).
23. Gail Dudley, Electronic Records, Patient Confidentiality, and the Impact of HIPAA,
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Other healthcare bills not directly addressing medical privacy,
however, did pass, including HIPAA on August 21, 1996. 24 The
original HIPAA statute, though, dealt only tangentially with PHI
privacy through the adoption and standardization of electronic
health records. 25 The central intent of HIPAA was, ironically,
unrelated to its infamous privacy requirements. HIPAA’s purpose
was to “mak[e] healthcare delivery more efficient and increas[e] the
number of Americans with health insurance coverage” 26 primarily by
guaranteeing availability of private health insurance coverage for
some and “limit[ing] the use of pre-existing condition clauses.” 27
Additionally, HIPAA encouraged the purchase of long-term
insurance through tax incentives as well as the creation of state
insurance pools for high-risk individuals. 28 Though some of these
sections arguably had positive effects on universally accessible
insurance provisions, this Comment will not address the successes or
lack thereof of these portions of the statute particularly because
insurance provisions in the Affordable Care Act have largely replaced
the insurance portability and accessibility provisions. 29
The administrative simplification provisions present in the
HIPAA statute30 instructed the Secretary of HHS to create
regulatory guidelines concerning the electronic transmission of

PATIENT SAFETY & QUALITY HEALTHCARE (Mar. 20, 2014 8:24 PM),
http://www.psqh.com/octdec04/dudley.html.
24. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 261, 100 Stat. 1936, 2021 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5–42
U.S.C.).
25. Id. (“It is the purpose of this subtitle to . . . encourag[e] the development of a
health information system through the establishment of standards and requirements for the
electronic transmission of certain health information.”).
26. INST. OF MED., COMM. ON HEALTH RESEARCH & THE PRIVACY OF HEALTH INFO.,
BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH
RESEARCH 63 (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds., 2009), available at http://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK9576/ [hereinafter BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE].
27. S. REP. NO. 105-5, at 30 (1997). See also BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., THE LAW OF
HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 352 (7th ed. 2013). HIPAA amended ERISA, the
Public Health Services Act, and the Internal Revenue Code to restrict pre-existing condition
clauses and prohibit discrimination in rates and coverage within employee groups. Id.
28. FURROW ET AL., supra note 27, at 407–08.
29. Id. at 407. The privacy provisions of HIPAA at issue in this paper are unhindered by
the ACA.
30. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 262, 100 Stat. 1936, 2021 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5–42
U.S.C.).
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PHI. 31 The primary purpose of the HHS requirements was to
standardize electronic health records and electronic medical
records, 32 not to create federal regulations specifically targeting
health information privacy concerns.
HIPAA also delegated enforcement to HHS, which began to
establish standards for electronic medical data storage and
transmission. 33 HHS first issued proposed HIPAA privacy rules for
public comment in 2000, which received an “enormous volume of
comments.” 34 Perhaps recognizing a rising public concern about
electronic PHI transmission, the department widely broadcast its
future adoption of uniform security rules, 35 which set minimum
requirements for PHI protection and use, 36 thereby temporarily
assuaging the public’s concerns. After several drafts, the final rule was
released in 2002. 37 Thus, the current HIPAA regulation regime is
not a “result of a[ny] direct congressional statutory command but
[instead arose] from a fairly broad interpretation of the statute by the
implementing agency,” 38 and the current state of HIPAA culture
bears little resemblance to the original statutory privacy suggestions.
The HIPAA statute as now written is intended “to combat
waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care
delivery, . . . to improve access to long-term care services and

31. Id.
32. BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, supra note 26. “EMR” refers to “electronic
medical record,” and though widely used interchangeably with “EHR,” or “electronic health
record,” EMR is technically a computerized patient record maintained within one single
healthcare entity rather than made nationally available regardless of patient location.
33. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act § 264 (“Not later than . . .
12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services shall submit . . . detailed recommendations on standards with respect to the privacy of
individually identifiable health information.”).
34. BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, supra note 26, at 64.
35. See, e.g., Health Insurance Reform: Standards for Electronic Transactions, 65 Fed.
Reg. 50, 312, 50, 351 (Oct. 16, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 162). (“As
discussed in the proposals, the regulations will provide a consistent and efficient set of rules for
the handling and protection of health information. . . . [T]he promulgation of a final privacy
standard will enhance public confidence that highly personal and sensitive information is being
properly protected, and therefore, it will enhance the public acceptance of increased use of
electronic systems.”).
36. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2002).
37. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2002). Most health care organizations were required to
comply by April 14, 2003. BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, supra note 26, at 64.
38. Ilene N. Moore et al., Confidentiality and Privacy in Health Care from the Patient’s
Perspective: Does HIPAA Help?, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 215, 228 (2007).
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coverage, [and] to simplify the administration of health insurance.” 39
HHS declared that its “goal is, and has always been, to permit
[appropriate data-sharing between covered entities] to occur with
little or no restriction” 40 with as much “flexibility” as possible. 41
HIPAA regulatory enforcement has frustrated these goals through its
expressive effect.
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF EXPRESSIVE LAW THEORY
Roughly two decades ago, legal theorists began examining ways
in which the law communicates and even alters social values. 42 Legal
theorists also recognized that the law can shape customs through its
effect on social norms in the aggregate. 43 Individuals endorse these
customs partly by observing others’ actions, even if those behaviors
are exhibited in response to laws, and partly by “distorting their
public responses in the interest of maintaining social acceptance.” 44
This can be particularly true of laws that include immediate sanction.
Over extended periods of time, the resulting habit formation directly
informs moral education. 45 Laws that include sanctions are especially
prone to expressive qualities because the threat of sanction itself
encourages altered behavior, and, ultimately, these types of laws
most often alter social norms. 46

39. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
40. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg.
53,182, 53, 208–9 (Aug. 14, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
41. Id.
42. Wittlin, supra note 15, at 420 (citing Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics,
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 585 (1998)).
43. Daniel L. Chen & Susan Yeh, Distinguishing Between Custom and Law: Empirical
Examples of Endogeneity in Property and First Amendment Precedents, 21 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1081, 1081–82 (2013).
44. Id. at 1082 (citing Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999)) (analyzing the channels from perception formation
to regulatory policy changes); Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559 (2002)
(applying rational choice theory to explain the role of custom in international law).
45. Wittlin, supra note 15, at 427 (citing H. LAURENCE ROSS, DETERRING THE
DRINKING
DRIVER
8
(1981),
available
at
http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/25000/25500/25588/DOT-HS-805-820.pdf).
46. See, e.g., Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury
Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 1, 2 (2003); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 594
(1998).
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Theories about how law’s “expressive statements” 47 alter
behavior and which aspects of law produce expressive effect can be
divided into three major categories: (1) theories that the law creates
a “meaning account” for pre-established social norms or that the law
creates an anticipated action; 48 (2) theories that suggest laws signal
existing norms and consequently changes behavior to match the
norm; 49 and (3) theories that law can change social norms by altering
individual values, which then directly shapes social norms. 50
In the first group, theorists Cass Sunstein and Lawrence Lessig
argue that law can change the social meaning of an action through
“social condemnation” or “positive social effects.” 51 Lessig cites the
historical example of dueling to support his point: a law that
prohibited dueling did little to curb the practice because interests in
“honor” prevailed, but a law that made a duel participant ineligible
for public office more effectively discouraged the practice. 52 The
former law added only potential jail time, but the second created
what Sunstein calls a “meaning account” 53 by infringing on the duty
to serve in one’s community and consequently “ambiguated the
social meaning of dueling.” 54
The second group of theories, including work by theorist
Richard McAdams, suggests that the law signals existing norms. 55
Like Sunstein’s “meaning account,” this theory recognizes society’s
interpretation of an act, but this branch of expression theory does
not assume laws actively change social meaning and instead argues
that “law changes behavior by signaling the underlying attitudes of a
community or society.” 56 By proposing that laws signal social values,
47. Wittlin, supra note 15, at 423.
48. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2032–33 (1996).
49. See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV.
339, 340 (2000).
50. See Cooter, supra note 46, at 586.
51. Wittlin, supra note 15, at 424 (citing Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181, 2185 (1996)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 425 (citing Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2021, 2052 (1996)).
54. Id. at 424 (citing Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2181, 2186–87 (1996)).
55. See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV.
339, 340 (2000).
56. Id.
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McAdams relies on the presumption that “democratically produced
legislative outcomes”—or, at least, those that are well-publicized and
created separately from interest group lobbying 57—“are positively
correlated with popular attitudes.” 58
The third category of theories includes Robert Cooter’s research
regarding a law’s expressive function as a way to change behaviors.
He argues that the law has two expressive functions: to either
“change social norms directly by solving collective action problems”
or to “change social norms by shaping individual values.” 59 The
former is more applicable to public goods laws, like anti-littering
laws, rather than laws influencing risky behaviors—for example,
failing to adequately protect patient privacy. The theory relies on
Cooter’s vision of a world with a stable social equilibrium, where a
law may shift the equilibrium to a new focal point. 60 When it comes
to law’s second expressive function—changing social values by
changing individual values—Cooter posits “that a rational person
will want to change her preferences when the opportunities
presented by this observable change in character are superior
according to both new preferences and old preferences.” 61 Cooter
notes that laws with sanctions prompt “character improvement” and
ultimately alter internalized values. 62 In the aggregate, reformed
individual values build a new social norm, 63 defined as “an obligation
backed by a social sanction.” 64 Through deterrence efforts (for
example, jail time or monetary fines), the state can supplement
negative social costs associated with disobeying a social norm. 65
Finally, once an individual has internalized the norm and changed
her preferences, there is a personal cost from violating the norm,
and, therefore, the public is more likely to observe the norm. 66 Thus,

57. Wittlin, supra note 15, at 425 (citing McAdams, supra note 55).
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing Cooter, supra note 46, at 586).
60. Id. at 425–26 (citing Cooter, supra note 46, at 594).
61. Id. at 426 (citing Cooter, supra note 46, at 600).
62. See Cooter, supra note 46, at 605.
63. See id.; see also Chen & Yeh, supra note 43, at 1081–82.
64. Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and
Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000).
65. Id. at 7–8, 15.
66. Id. at 7.
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expression, deterrence, and internalization of laws change individual
preferences, choices, and, ultimately, collective norms. 67
Cooter’s theory is most accurate when applied to laws backed by
sanctions. Laws backed by a sanction are more likely to influence
individual behavior and consequently social norms; the “sanction
itself has expressive force.” 68 Accordingly, these results suggest that
in the arena of laws backed by sanctions—like HIPAA—Cooter’s
second theory best explains the outcome: threatened sanctions alone
transform behavior and social norms to match the message
communicated by the law.
III. CREATION OF HIPAA CULTURE
Cooter’s theory best explains what happened following
enactment of the HIPAA statute. The HIPAA statute created a
“HIPAA-culture”; the overbroad law and threat of sanctions
spawned an inevitably overbroad regulatory privacy regime and
effectively convinced patients and providers that the act of sharing
PHI is morally problematic. 69 Additionally, steep fines exacerbate the
expressive effect of sanctions 70–and HIPAA fines can be devastatingly
high. 71 Sections A and B of this part explain the creation of HIPAA
culture, which has arisen from HIPAA violation punishments, public
shaming techniques on HHS’s “Wall of Shame,” 72 recent Omnibus
HIPAA alterations, and resulting pervasive “compliance over

67. Id. Incidentally, recently published empirical data confirm the applicability and
reality of Cooter’s second theory. One recent study that measured the impact of seatbelt laws
on seatbelt usage demonstrates that laws alter individual behavior and communicate social
norms through that altered behavior. But even without widespread conformance to the law,
the mere existence of such a law increased seatbelt usage. Wittlin, supra note 15, at 421.
68. Id.
69. See Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms of File Sharing, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 577, 623 (2006).
70. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591,
593, 623 (1996).
71. These violations will be thoroughly discussed in Section B of this Part. Under the
most recent Omnibus HIPAA law, as of September 23, 2013, violations range from $100 to
$50,000. The maximum civil penalty for all identical violations in a given year, whether
knowing or due to willful, uncorrected neglect, is $1.5 million. Modifications to HIPAA Rules,
supra note 10, at 5583.
72. Health Information Privacy: Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breach
notificationrule/breachtool.html (last updated 2014) [hereinafter “WALL OF SHAME”].
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security” provider mindset. 73 Section C examines the established
HIPAA culture and current state of the HIPAA statute, which
demonstrate that the statute’s expression, deterrence, and
internalization have now changed social norms regarding PHI
protections. Section D reviews legitimate privacy considerations.
A. A Study of HIPAA Compliance and Patient Complaints: Creation
of the HIPAA Culture
A study conducted by Vanderbilt University Center for Patient
and Professional Advocacy investigated patient concerns regarding
privacy in health care settings, including whether there has been any
improvement in privacy protection since HIPAA implementation. 74
The Vanderbilt study analyzed complaint data from inpatient,
outpatient, and emergency departments originating from three
geographically distant academic medical centers over a five-year
period. 75 The study first revealed that patients’ perceptions of privacy
protections are a “major factor” in measuring their subjective
satisfaction with received healthcare as well as the objective quality of
their medical care, 76 in part because patients are likely to provide
incomplete medical information if they perceive compromised
confidentiality standards. 77 Second, patients complained most about
incidental and willful disclosures, followed by “environmental
disclosures” and institutional privacy policies. 78 Physicians were
mentioned in 20% of privacy complaints 79 while non-physicians were
associated with more than 50% of privacy complaints. 80
Importantly, privacy-related complaints for all institutions
increased in frequency during the second observation period (from
2003 to 2005) 81 and rose concurrently with institutional efforts from

73. KROLL ADVISORY SOLUTIONS, 2012 HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT: SECURITY OF
PATIENT DATA 6 (2012), available at http://www.csb.uncw.edu/people/cummingsj
ANALYTICS
/classes/MIS534/Articles/Ch6SecurityReport.pdf
[hereinafter
“HIMSS
REPORT”].
74. Moore et al., supra note 38, at 218–19.
75. Id. at 235–36.
76. Id. at 233.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 237.
79. Id. at 238.
80. Id. at 240.
81. Id. at 239.
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all organizations to better comply with HIPAA requirements. 82 The
patient work volume, including procedures and numbers of patients,
increased by 21% from the first observation period to the second, but
the privacy-related complaints rose more than 140% on a constant
workload basis across the board 83 and up to 200% on an absolute
basis in at least one institution. 84 The type of complaints and
numbers in each category did not vary significantly from one
institution to another. 85 Furthermore, the number of privacy-related
complaints as compared to other patient complaints rose significantly
from the first observational period to the second. 86 These complaint
increases, while staggering, may actually be the “tip of the iceberg”
in patient privacy anxieties because very few dissatisfied or concerned
patients inform the offender of their frustrations, and even fewer
register a formal or informal complaint. 87
The increase in patient privacy complaints from the first
observational period to the second, during the first of which the final
HIPAA privacy rules were implemented, might have resulted from
the expressive effect of the law. Despite the fact that the institutions
were more HIPAA compliant, the number of patient privacy
complaints rose 140% on a constant workload basis between the first
and second observational periods and the ratio of privacy complaints
to non-privacy complaints rose dramatically for two of the three
institutions. 88 The rise in workload-volume does not adequately
explain the disparity. 89
These numbers may suggest that as patients became more aware
of HIPAA’s existence between the first and second observational
periods in the study, patients also became more fearful of privacy
breaches. The author of the Vanderbilt study suggests that the
institutions may not have been HIPAA compliant and may have
82. Id. at 244.
83. Id. at 239–40.
84. Id. at 244–45.
85. Id. at 245.
86. Id. at 244–45.
87. Id. at 243 (citing ARTHUR BEST, WHEN CONSUMERS COMPLAIN 114–30 (1977);
Ellen Annandale & Kate Hunt, Accounts of Disagreements with Doctors, 46 SOC. SCI. & MED.
119, 125 (1998); Mark Schlesinger et al., Voices Unheard: Barriers to Expressing Dissatisfaction
to Health Plans, 80 MILLBANK Q. 709, 717 (2002) (citing 1988 study that found “as few as
11 percent of American patients complain about the problems they experience”).
88. Id. at 239–40.
89. See generally id.
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simply had more legitimate privacy breaches from the first to second
observational period. 90 As will later be discussed, HIPAA compliance
does not necessarily equate with increased PHI security, 91 but it is
extremely unlikely that in efforts to become more HIPAA compliant
and better protect patient data, the institutions became less compliant
and less secure. Furthermore, in the second observational period,
some patients “complained of behaviors or disclosures that are, in
fact, allowed by HIPAA.” 92 Though a HIPAA-compliant institution
is not necessarily a PHI-secure institution, the institutions in the
study nevertheless made efforts to improve in those areas over the
period studied. Yet most experienced a dramatic surge in privacyrelated patient complaints. 93 This suggests that the confidentiality
and privacy issues gained saliency and popularity through
dissemination of HIPAA information from providers to patients. 94
Because the HIPAA statute was so poorly understood, even by
professionals, 95 it is unlikely that during that time period patients
learned their rights directly from the HIPAA statute; nevertheless,
the patients’ limited exposure to the statute through institutions’
privacy notices, HIPAA acknowledgement forms, and provider
behavior or commentary changed their understanding of medical
privacy from the first to the second observational period. 96
Accordingly, patients likely became more aware of HIPAA’s
existence, if not its particulars, and their doctors’ fears of sanctions for
non-compliance; thus, the “HIPAA culture” was born.
B. HIPAA Violations and Their Contribution to HIPAA Culture
Cooter’s theory of expressive law demonstrates that laws backed
by sanctions have particular expressive force, and threatened

90. Id. at 246.
91. HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT, supra note 73, at 6.
92. Moore et al., supra note 38, at 248.
93. Id. at 244.
94. Id. at 245.
95. Id. at 248 (citations omitted) (“While patients retain the authority to prohibit
disclosures not otherwise excepted, the list of exceptions is so extensive as to eviscerate any
common understanding of what it means to be in control of one’s medical information.”); id.
at 250–51 (“[Notices of HIPAA privacy practices] have . . . been a common source of
unresolved confusion.”); id. at 255 (“[HHS] must articulate a norm that health care providers
and personnel can understand and follow.”).
96. Id. at 239–40.
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sanctions alone influence social norms to match the message
communicated by the law. 97 In the context of HIPAA, excessively
high monetary penalties have contributed to HIPAA culture by
generating justified fear of enormous financial burdens. 98 These
concerns are likely enhanced by the “Wall of Shame” and recent
updates to the HIPAA statute through the Omnibus HIPAA Act in
January 2013. 99 While to some limited degree it is likely that PHI
will be better protected by the Omnibus revisions that extend
potential liability to business associates, expand the requirements for
reportable breaches, and increase HIPAA audits, a recent survey
reveals that increased HIPAA compliance does not equate to
increased PHI protection among health care organizations. In fact,
those organizations surveyed consistently prioritize compliance over
patient information security. 100 The law and its sanctions have
created a pervasive HIPAA culture that favors compliance over
privacy. This section will briefly review (1) the HIPAA penalties, (2)
the “Wall of Shame,” (3) changes to the Omnibus HIPAA law, and
(4) recent survey data demonstrating providers’ greater interest in
HIPAA compliance than PHI security.
1. The HIPAA penalties
Violating HIPAA can be extremely costly. The Office of Civil
Rights under HHS handles HIPAA complaints and can impose civil
penalties for failure to comply. 101 Prior to the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act,
HIPAA violations were $100 per unknowing violation with a
$25,000 cap. 102 After February 17, 2009, under HITECH, penalties
ranged from $100 to $50,000 or more per violation. 103 Each penalty
for individual violations was tiered based on the entity’s perceived

97. Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 594 (1998).
98. See generally Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
(HITECH) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (2009).
99. WALL OF SHAME, supra note 72.
100. HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT, supra note 73.
101. 45 C.F.R. § 160.404 (2013).
102. Patrick Ouellette, HIPAA Omnibus and HITECH Civil Penalty Changes,
HEALTHIT SECURITY (Jan. 23, 2013), http://healthitsecurity.com/2013/01/23/hipaaomnibus-and-hitech-civil-penalty-changes/.
103. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (2009).
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culpability with annual caps ranging from $25,000 to $1.5
million. 104 Under the most recent Omnibus HIPAA law, as of
September 23, 2013, violations still range from $100 to $50,000 in
a tiered fashion, but the maximum civil penalty for all identical
violations in a given year, whether knowing or due to willful,
uncorrected neglect, is $1.5 million. 105 Each unauthorized PHI
disclosure incident can comprise multiple violations. 106 This requires
HHS to “count” the violations after a PHI breach based on the
“nature and extent of the violation.” 107 This may include people
affected, time period, level and type of harm, any previous HIPAA
violations, nature of the organization at fault, timely reporting, the
organization’s financial condition, and any other number of
factors; 108 thus, the original violation may easily be multiplied up to
the $1.5 million cap. 109 The same, single incident may also violate
multiple portions of the Security Rule requiring accurate breach
prevention. 110 Though the HIPAA statute’s substantive requirements
have generated confusion in the health community, the statute’s
penalties are well advertised and widely dreaded among healthcare
organizations. 111
2. The “Wall of Shame”
The consequent and prevalent anxiety among providers is further
exacerbated by the threat of public humiliation on the HHS “Wall of
Shame.” In 2009, the Office of Civil Rights started recording
incidents of PHI breaches and created the “Wall of Shame,” which
publicly exposes breaches affecting 500 people or more. 112 In theory,
the “Wall of Shame” further incentivizes covered entities and
business associates to prioritize patient record confidentiality, but

104. Id.
105. Modifications to HIPAA Rules, supra note 10, at 5583.
106. Id. at 5584.
107. 45 C.F.R. § 160.408 (2011).
108. Id.
109. Id., see “HIPAA Final Rule Expands Liability for Violations, Clarifies Penalty
Assessment Methodology” (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNe
wsletters/all/HIPAA-Final-Rule-Expands-Liability-for-Violations-Clarifies-Penalty-Assessment-Me
thodology.
110. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.308–14 (2013).
111. AMA HIPAA Violations, supra note 9.
112. WALL OF SHAME, supra note 72.
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recent studies show that it has not had that effect—again
demonstrative of HIPAA culture. 113
3. Changes to the Omnibus HIPAA law
Though the updated Omnibus HIPAA law will likely better
protect patient privacy than the prior law by “strengthen[ing] the
limitations on the use and disclosure of protected health
information” in various arenas, 114 the increased penalties are also
likely to exacerbate already-existing provider fears and HIPAA
culture. Moreover, under the new law, business associates of covered
entities are directly liable for HIPAA compliance. 115 The Omnibus
law expanded the definition of “business associate” to include any
“subcontractor that creates, receives, maintains, or transmits
protected health information,” 116 such as a cloud-service provider.
Under the new Omnibus law, the definition of a “breach” is
significantly more expansive as well. Prior to the Omnibus HIPAA
rule, a breach was defined as an event that “compromises the security
or privacy of the protected health information such that the use or
disclosure poses a significant risk of financial, reputational or other
harm to the individual.” 117 The new rule, however, extends the
definition to include even the “risk” of PHI disclosure or
impermissible use as identified through a risk assessment approach. 118
This makes required HHS notification for breach more likely. 119
Only when an entity can “demonstrate there is no significant risk of
harm” is the entity excused from reporting the breach. 120
Not only has the scope of violations expanded, but recent reports
also show an increase in HIPAA audits, which will likely aggravate
113. See HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT, supra note 73.
114. Modifications to HIPAA Rules, supra note 10, at 5566.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 5572.
117. Modifications to HIPAA Rules, supra note 10, at 5639; see also DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, Health Information Privacy: Breach Notification
Rule,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/
index.html (follow “Definition of Breach” hyperlink) (last visited October 2, 2014).
118. Modifications to HIPAA Rules, supra note 10, at 5640.
119. New Omnibus Rule Released: HIPAA Puts on More Weight, DWT.COM,
http://www.dwt.com/new-omnibus-rule-released-hipaa-puts-on-more-weight-01-23-2013/ (last
visited Nov. 14, 2014)
120. Id.
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compliance fears. 121 The law’s changes in penalty and enforcement
provisions suggest audits will further increase, which will likely
exacerbate the expressive and social effects of HIPAA sanctions and,
through that, HIPAA culture. 122 Under the Omnibus rule, HHS no
longer must attempt to informally resolve privacy complaints: HHS
now has the discretion to determine whether the department will
pursue informal resolution before proceeding to the formal penalty
assessment process. 123 Furthermore, civil violations are now tiered to
correlate the severity of a violation with the nature and circumstances
surrounding the incident, which suggests HHS will assess penalties
almost automatically unless the potential violator can show that the
breach was not due to willful neglect and was “timely” corrected. 124
Under the Omnibus rule, HHS is authorized to share any
information gathered from a compliance check with other law
enforcement agencies, such as a state attorney general’s office. 125
Naturally, these other agencies are free to pursue their own
investigations. 126
4. Demonstrative survey
Not surprisingly, with increased threats of monetary sanctions,
the “Wall of Shame,” and HIPAA audits, healthcare organizations
have justifiably reacted with fear of sharing PHI and, in the

121. Jack Anderson, HIPAA Audits Increase in 2014, Include Business Associates,
(Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.compliancehelper.com/post/2030180hipaa-audits-increase-in-2014-include; see also Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, HIPAA Audits:
SECURITY
(Sept.
23,
2013),
More
to
Come
in
2014,
GOVINFO
http://www.govinfosecurity.com/hipaa-audits-more-to-come-in-2014-a-6090.
122. If HIPAA enforcement directly contributed to increased patient security, these
numbers might be encouraging. But, as previously demonstrated, increased compliance does
not lead to increased PHI protection.
123. HIPAA Omnibus Final Rule: Enforcement Action Following September 23
Compliance Deadline, VEDDER PRICE (Sept. 2013), http://www.vedderprice.com/files/
Publication/bca4ca87-9723-4ad9-8e95ba76069b3cab/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/aa4f540a-389e-47cb-8223-07f2e
1672bb9/HIPAA%20Omnibus%20Final%20Rule.pdf.
124. Ouellette, supra note 101.
125. Modifications to HIPAA Rules, supra note 10, at 5579.
126. See Eric D. Altholz & Christopher Lockman, Enhanced Penalties and Stiffer
Enforcement for HIPAA Violations, BENEFITS L. UPDATE: EMP. BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION BLOG (Apr. 7, 2013, 9:28 AM), http://www.employeebenefitsupdate.com
/benefits-law-update/2013/4/7/enhanced-penalties-and-stiffer-enforcement-for-hipaaviolati.html.
COMPLIANCE HELPER
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aggregate, augmented the HIPAA culture. A biannual survey of
United States healthcare provider facilities, performed by a “leading
risk consulting firm,” found that healthcare providers “prioritize
compliance over security.” 127 Respondents believe that, even though
breach incidents are steadily rising, increased preparations to pass a
HIPAA audit correlate to increased data security. 128 The survey
results troublingly demonstrate that protecting patient data is not
the driving force behind these respondents’ security policies and
procedures. Rather, the organizations are motivated by compliance
interests and ultimately avoiding OCR audit fees. 129 Though
organizations actively take steps to ensure PHI security, they “are so
focused on meeting compliance requirements that they have little
awareness of the efficacy of their security programs.” 130
The study revealed, however, that institutional HIPAA
compliance does not equate with PHI security: 96% of organizations
conducted a formal risk analysis, but 27% still experienced a breach
and 18% were unsure whether their organization had experienced a
breach in the past twelve months. 131 Additionally, despite the
increased privacy training and heighted security policies across nearly
all organizations, 45% indicated that “lack of staff attention to policy
puts data at risk.” 132 Of the 27% of respondents that experienced a
breach, only one-quarter of those organizations subsequently
updated their organization’s “security action plan.” 133 However, 73%
of respondents said changes in external regulations (for example,
HIPAA or HITECH) motivated changes to PHI protection plans. 134
The data also demonstrate that business associate third-party
arrangements dangerously compromise patient PHI, but because
business associates were not liable under the HIPPA statute at the
time, no efforts were made to secure PHI data held by business
associates. 135 Third-party business associates comprised the fastest127. HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT, supra note 73, at 6 (emphasis added).
128. Id. On a scale from one to seven, with one being “not at all prepared” and seven
being “extremely prepared,” respondents overall gave themselves a 6.4, as opposed to 6.06 in
2010 and 5.88 in 2008. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Before the HIPAA Omnibus update in May 2013, business associates were not
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rising source of data breaches (at the time, 18% of breaches). 136
Twenty-eight percent of respondents indicated that sharing PHI
with these third parties is the “top item that put patient data at
risk,” 137 and the most recent numbers suggest that “out of the 26.8
million individuals whose data has been breached, 48 percent were
impacted by breaches involving [business associates].” 138 Despite
these numbers, only half of respondents in the healthcare provider
survey indicated that they ensure their third-party vendors “conduct
a periodic risk analysis to identify security risks and
vulnerabilities.” 139
C. Current State of HIPAA
Despite the fact that PHI can now be more secure in HIEs than
ever before, record numbers of survey takers indicate increasing fear
of privacy hackers and what has become a veritable PHI paranoia
derived from HIPAA culture. 140
In the immediate aftermath of HIPAA, surveys demonstrated
that public privacy concerns had decreased—down to 67% 141 from
approximately 75% in a pre-HIPAA study. 142 Polls taken in the
immediate aftermath of HIPAA are not demonstrative of current
feelings regarding health privacy; very limited data sets are available
to assess the value of HIPAA in relation to more contemporary fears,
including HIEs. Particularly with the increased utilization of health
information technology and electronic health records, surveys
indicate that the public is increasingly concerned about PHI privacy
and security. 143 A 2012 survey by Harris Interactive reported that

liable under HIPAA regulations.
136. HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT, supra note 73, at 6.
137. Id.
138. Melissa McCormack, The Internet Isn’t to Blame for HIPAA Breaches, THE
PROFITABLE PRAC.: HELPING YOU GROW A MORE PROFITABLE, EFFICIENT & FULFILLING
PRAC. (Sept. 16, 2013), http://profitable-practice.softwareadvice.com/internet-isnt-toblame-for-hipaa-breaches-0913/.
139. HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT, supra note 73, at 7.
140. FORRESTER RESEARCH, NATIONAL CONSUMER HEALTH PRIVACY SURVEY 2005
(Nov. 2005), available at http://www.chcf.org/publications/2005/11/national-consumerhealth-privacy-survey-2005.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Only 26 Percent of Americans Want Electronic Medical Records, Says Xerox Survey,
XEROX (July 31, 2012), http://news.xerox.com/news/Xerox-Surveys-Americans-Electronic-
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only 26% of patients wanted their medical records digitally
accessible. 144 More than 85% of respondents expressed privacy
concern about digital medical records, particularly hackers, lost files,
or misused data, up from 82% in 2010. 145 These data demonstrate
how little electronic health record systems are understood.
More importantly for purposes of this Comment, these survey
data demonstrate that the HIPAA statute’s effectiveness has been
severely limited by ambiguous guidelines and deference to state laws
that can actually be stricter than the federal regulations, doubtlessly
adding to the creation of HIPAA culture. 146 HSS originally intended
HIPAA privacy practices to promote discussions between patients
and providers “related to the use and disclosure of protected health
information about him or her” 147; instead, privacy practices have
become a common source of unresolved perplexity. Significant gaps
remain in the HIPAA enactment, including differing patient consent
protocols nationally and intrastate, misunderstanding regarding
“meaningful use,” and improving levels of patient involvement in
using their health information. 148
This confusion and frustration associated with enacting HIPAA
has transferred to health care consumers as well—and not just
because no individual remedy for redress exists for individuals’
privacy violated by HIPAA breaches. 149 Approximately 13% of people
surveyed in 2005 admit to behaving in various ways meant to protect
Health-Records [hereinafter XEROX 2012] (referencing a Harris Interactive survey from May
11–15, 2012).
144. Id. (referencing a Harris Interactive survey from May 11–15, 2012).
145. See id. (referencing a Harris Interactive survey from May 11 to 15, 2012); XEROX: A
STUDY ABOUT MEDICAL RECORDS (Harris Interactive, 2010), available at http://pitchengine
.com/xeroxcorporation/xerox-survey-patients-know-little-about-impact-of-electronic-healthrecords-); see also Deborah Peel, Only 26 Percent of Americans Want Electronic Medical
Records, Says Xerox Survey, PATIENT PRIVACY RIGHTS (July 31, 2012),
http://patientprivacyrights.org/2012/07/only-26-percent-of-americans-want-electronicmedical-records-says-xerox-survey/.
146. See Deth Sao, Amar Gupta & David A. Gantz, Interoperable Electronic Health Care
Record: A Case for Adoption of a National Standard to Stem the Ongoing Health Care Crisis,
34 J. LEGAL MED. 55, 62 (2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2; 63 Fed. Reg. at 43,258; John
R. Christiansen, Legal Speed Bumps on the Road to Health Information Exchange, J. HEALTH &
LIFE SCI. L. 1, 24 (2008)).
147. Moore et al., supra note 38, at 250–51 (citing Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182, 53,201 (Aug. 14, 2002) (to be codified
at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164)).
148. Christiansen, supra note 146, at 22–23.
149. Id. at 23.
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their privacy, even at the expense of their own health. 150 These
behaviors included, but were not limited to, lying to practitioners
about symptoms or circumstances surrounding illness or injury,
providing inaccurate or incomplete information, paying for health
care services in cash even if covered by insurance, or avoiding care
altogether. 151
D. Legitimate Privacy Considerations
Concern over the privacy paranoia created by HIPAA should be
understood neither as a rejection of the importance of privacy nor as
a condemnation of HIPAA’s goals to protect PHI. Privacy is an
essential part of providing and receiving medical care, and HIPAA
successfully raised the privacy-protection standards. PHI-sharing
technology pre-HIPAA focused “around what was the least
disruptive to the physicians [and] nurses” 152 and rights to medical
privacy widely varied between states. 153 PHI sharing today abides by
national principles of privacy protection, broken only by patient
consent. 154
Additionally, HIPAA enforcement certainly has had some
positive outcomes. It created minimum privacy standards,
guaranteed an individual’s access to personal records 155 and access to
an accounting of PHI disclosures for the prior six years, required
providers to post a notice of their privacy practices, and allowed
individuals to file privacy complaints with their providers and health
plans. 156 Covered entities are also required to appoint a privacy
officer and provide employee HIPAA training. 157
The expressive effect of HIPAA and its sanctions is likely
exacerbated because of the legitimately sacrosanct nature of medical

150. FORRESTER RESEARCH, supra note 140.
151. Id.
152. Bill Elmore, Life Before HIPAA, TECH DECISION MAKER (Sep. 25, 2006, 10:04
PM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/tech-decision-maker/life-before-hipaa.
153. Fact Sheet 8a: HIPAA Basics: Medical Privacy in the Electronic Age, PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE (revised Feb. 2013), https://www.privacyrights.org/HIPAA-basicsmedical-privacy-electronic-age.
154. Id.
155. Id. Previously, approximately half the states had laws mandating personal access to
one’s medical records.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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privacy. Hippocrates first described the doctor-patient confidentiality
standard unique to medicine: “All that may come to my knowledge
in the exercise of my profession . . . which ought not to be spread
abroad, I will keep secret and will never reveal.” 158 Similarly, the
“Principles of Medical Ethics” from the American Medical
Association, of which the code version—Code of Medical Ethics—is
the “authoritative ethics guide for practicing physicians,” 159
incorporates confidentiality concerns in Section IV, which declares
that “[a] physician shall respect the rights of patients, . . . and shall
safeguard patient confidences and privacy.” 160 Violation of this
confidentiality, even if too limited in scope to trigger HIPAA’s
penalties, can lead to patient embarrassment, social isolation, or
health-related discrimination. 161
Furthermore, with the increase of health information technology,
an infringement of medical privacy can have far-reaching effects. 162
The traditional physician control of patient data is simply no longer
realistic; today, medical care involves coordination and assistance
from multiple services or organizations and often includes multiple
non-physician parties. 163 PHI is obtained and processed by
employees of the health care system and maintained in electronic
format. “The expanding number of those whose jobs provide them
with access to medical information increases the risk that individuals
will act outside the scope of authorization to obtain information they
158. Moore et al., supra note 38, at 219–20.
159. History of AMA Ethics, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.ama-assn
.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-history/history-ama-ethics.page? (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
160. Principles of Medical Ethics, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/principlesmedical-ethics.page (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
161. See, e.g., Tony Francis, HIPAA Violation Not a Tort . . . But . . ., MEDSCAPE (Mar.
8, 2012, 9:59 AM), http://boards.medscape.com/forums/?128@@.2a300761!comment=1
(discussing the various concerns with an “invasion of privacy,” such as a HIPAA violation).
162. This is even truer with modern advances in genetic research that may exacerbate
potential risks to medical privacy. Potentially, genetic information available in an HIE could
create a biological “scarlet letter” for insurance companies looking to exclude more expensive
customers and consequently erode the patient-physician relationship or even encourage the
patient not to seek care. Paul A. Lombardo, Genetic Confidentiality: What’s the Big Secret?, 3
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 589, 595–96 (1996).
163. See Christopher R. Smith, Somebody’s Watching Me: Protecting Patient Privacy in
Prescription Health Information, 36 VT. L. REV. 931, 931 (2012) (“In today’s ever-expanding
world of internet technology and electronic data transmission, patient disclosure of
prescription health information is being distributed to a widening circle of entities and
individuals, raising serious patient privacy concerns.”).
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do not legitimately need to perform their work.” 164 Health
information available through an electronic database could be
accessed by others, some of whom are not involved in the patientbased health care process, and transferred elsewhere almost
instantaneously. 165 Electronic storage and transfer of PHI between
numerous servers and vendors naturally expose data to privacy
breaches, 166 and existing laws on both the federal and state levels
provide insufficient compliance protocols. 167
Nevertheless, PHI in electronic record systems can be
protected—really protected, and not simply up to HIPAA
compliance standards—if the varying risks are “continuously guarded
and routinely observed.” 168 Properly guarded data sets are
significantly safer than paper-based systems, particularly when
considering the proportional types of data breaches reported on the
Wall of Shame. 169 Since the Wall’s creation, as of July 23, 2014, the
total number of patients affected by all major breaches was
32,150,360. 170 Forty-eight percent of those breaches arose from
theft incidents; eighteen percent were related to unauthorized PHI
access; eleven percent stemmed from PHI loss; eight percent of
incidents overall were linked to hacking; and only three percent of
incidents involved electronic health records. 171 This data suggest at
least two things: (1) most data breaches occur because “thieves are
not after the information in the laptop, but they’re after the laptop,”
as acknowledged by OCR Senior Health Information Privacy
Specialist Rachel Seeger; and (2) the majority of HIPAA breaches
could be prevented by putting and storing data into electronic
form. 172 These numbers reveal that some basic employee training—

164. Moore et al., supra note 38, at 225–26.
165. Id. at 226.
166. Laura Dunlop, Electronic Health Records: Interoperability Challenges Patients’ Right to
Privacy, 3 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 16, ¶ 7 (2007), available at http://digital.law.washing
ton.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/400/vo13_no4_art16.pdf?sequence=1.
167. Christiansen, supra note 146, at 22–24.
168. Moore et al., supra note 38, at 227.
169. WALL OF SHAME, supra note 72.
170. HIPAA & Breach Enforcement Statistics for August 2014, MELAMEDIA,
http://www.melamedia.com/HIPAA.Stats.home.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2014)
171. McCormack, supra note 138.
172. The five biggest breaches since reporting began on September 1, 2013, reaffirm this
conclusion because they are all theft- or loss-related: (1) TRICARE Management Activity,
4,901,432 individuals affected when a military health care provider’s business associate “lost”
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including encryption, complicated password creation, and theft
avoidance techniques—could have prevented the vast majority of
major HIPAA violations (i.e., those affecting more than five hundred
patient records). 173
Though hacking occurrences are far from insignificant or
impossible, 174 this data reveal that in large measure, breaches are not
due to unscrupulous individuals and human error. Hiring an IT team
could, in many instances, either prevent hacking incidents entirely or
minimize the damage should such hacking occur.
IV. HIE CREATION AND CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTATION
The culture that HIPAA has generated works at cross purposes
to the statute’s goals of not only protecting privacy but also
facilitating cost- and health-effective care through information
sharing. Instant sharing of PHI through an HIE between
providers—a way to instantaneously transmit patient records without
excess delay or cost to any party—has doubtlessly been hindered by
HIPAA culture despite widely acknowledged benefits of such
information sharing. There is very little disagreement that
widespread HIE infrastructure has huge benefits—particularly in
terms of cost saving and enhanced patient care—as evidenced by
successful HIE implementation in other countries. 175 Admittedly,
there are challenges in HIE-building (e.g., making the organizations
self-sustainable, securing technological adoption across multiple
organizations, adequately protecting PHI, etc.), but the greatest
backup tapes (or they were stolen); (2) Advocate Health Care, over four million affected when
four unencrypted computers were stolen; (3) Health Net, Inc., 1,900,000 affected when a
business associate misplaced nine servers; (4) NYC Health and Hospitals Corporation’s North
Bronx Healthcare Network, 1,700,000 affected when unencrypted backup tapes were stolen
from a business associate’s van; (5) AvMed, Inc, 1,220,000 affected when two laptops were
stolen from the facility—the encrypted laptop was recovered and the unencrypted laptop was
not. Id.
173. Id.
174. On the “Wall of Shame,” there are forty-four incidents citing “hacking” as the type
of breach. Of those forty-four incidents, three involved more than one million potential PHI
breaches: 156,000 at the Ankle & Foot Center in Tampa, FL, in 2010; 231,400 at Seacoast
Radiology, PA, in 2012; and 780,000 at the Utah Department of Health in 2012. Five
breaches exposed 10,000 to 100,000 patient records; ten breaches exposed 5,000 to 10,000
patient records, sixteen breaches exposed 1,000 to 5,000 patient records; and ten breaches
exposed 500 to 1,000 patient records. WALL OF SHAME, supra note 72.
175. Ariele Yaffee, Financing the Pulp to Digital Phenomenon, 7 J. HEALTH &
BIOMEDICAL L. 325, 332–33 (2011).
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concern by far has been related to medical privacy. In fact, PHI is
more secure in an HIE than it ever could be in paper format. The
experience of implementing the Houston HIE demonstrates the
effects of HIPAA culture: A PHI-sharing paranoia so extensive that,
even when presented with a cost-saving, enhanced-care-providing,
and PHI-protective solution, the medical community is hesitant to
enter a data-exchange system.
A. HIEs: Background, Benefits, and Challenges
An HIE is a “connecting point for an organized, standardized
process of data exchange across statewide, regional, [or] local
initiatives,” 176 through which electronic health records can be
transferred to the appropriate health care provider or organization at
the patient’s arrival or check-in. 177 HIEs have been vigorously
supported by George W. Bush, who in 2004 called for their
widespread implementation and use within ten years, 178 as well as
“by the Obama Administration as a ‘key element’ of innovation
strategy.” 179
The benefits of HIE systems are widely acknowledged 180 and
176. Health Information Exchange (HIE) Overview, HEALTH IT (updated 2014),
http://www.tmhp.com/Pages/HealthIT/HIT_HIE.aspx.
177. Electronic health record, or “EHR,” is widely used interchangeably with “EMR” or
“electronic medical record” even though the latter technically refers to a computerized patient
record maintained within one single healthcare entity. An EMR, by contrast, is made nationally
available regardless of patient location. See Dunlop, supra note 166, ¶¶ 3–4.
178. Kelly Cronin, Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology
3, DEP’T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/ecomm/e_rx/
mtgs/july2006/kcroninpp.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
179. Leslie P. Francis, When Patients Interact with EHRs: Problems of Privacy and
Confidentiality, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 171, 171 (2012) (citing THE WHITE
HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY
20 (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf).
180. For example, the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) became the
best medical provider in the nation in less than a decade, in large part because of its adoption
of a comprehensive EMR infrastructure, which provides one hundred percent patient record
availability throughout the VA and Department of Defense treatment facilities nationwide (163
hospitals, 800 clinics, and 135 nursing homes, total). The VA EMR system’s computerized
provider order entry decreased rates of adverse drug events as well as increased prescription
accuracy rates to nearly one hundred percent—a remarkable feat, particularly compared to the
national error rate of three to eight percent. The system also provides the highest quality of
care in the United States for almost any condition as a result of data tracking, and despite
national price inflation, VA costs have stabilized—“which is largely attributed to eliminated
repetitive lab tests and paperwork.” Sao, supra note 146, at 55–56.
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have been realized in other countries that have enacted similar
medical systems. 181 This section will provide a brief overview of some
of the significant benefits of HIEs, including healthcare cost
reduction and improved medical care through greater patient
involvement and enhanced patient tracking.
Administrative healthcare costs represent approximately thirtyone percent of the total healthcare costs in the United States. 182
These administrative costs are approximately thirty to seventy
percent higher than in countries equipped with similar mixed
private-public health systems. 183 Using electronic health records may
result in “$77.8 to $162 billion in cost savings per year in the U.S.
by streamlining administrative procedures and eliminating redundant
diagnostic tests and paperwork.” 184 It seems that data exchange
through an HIE would result in even greater savings.
HIE implementation also accelerates information transfer from
one provider to another 185 and, as a result, greatly reduces redundant
diagnostic testing or paperwork performed as a result of unavailable
patient history. 186 HIE implementation provides instant access to a
patient’s entire medical history, which allows uninterrupted patient
treatment 187 through enhanced portability and simultaneous access
181. Yaffee, supra note 175. Several other countries have created a nationwide electronic
health record infrastructure with reportedly great success. Sao et al., supra note 146, at 80–83.
Many industrialized nations have widespread HIE infrastructure, with approximately 80% to
100% of healthcare providers utilizing such systems. Yaffee, supra note 175, at 332–33. In
these countries, including Denmark, New Zealand, and Sweden, communications and
electronic health records sharing extend far past single healthcare entities; patient data is
appropriately shared among numerous providers to optimize patient health. Sao et al., supra
note 146, at 55–56. See Bradford Gray et al., Electronic Health Records: An International
Perspective on “Meaningful Use”, 28 COMMONWEALTH FUND 1 (2011), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.Org/~/
media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2011/Nov/1565-Gray_electronic_med_records_
meaning_use_intl_brief.pdf; Steve Arnold et. al., Electronic Health Records: A Global Perspective
5
(2007),
http://www.himss.org/content/files/DrArnold20011207EISPresentation
WhitePape.
182. LUCIEN WULSIN & ADAM DOUGHERTY, HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS: A PRIMER 1 (2008), available at https:// www.library.
ca.gov/crb/08/08-013.pdf.
183. Id.
184. Sao et al., supra note 146, at 58. See also Yaffee, supra note 175, at 336 (estimating
savings of $81 to $162 billion for implementing EMRs).
185. Yaffee, supra note 175, at 335.
186. Id. at 334–35.
187. Id. This is especially necessary during a medical crisis. For example, VA patients’
medical records were immediately available following the New Orleans evacuation during
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for multiple users. 188 This can help prevent or eliminate some
medical record errors 189 typically found on paper records, including
mishandled requests, misfiled information, or mislabeling, as well as
medical errors associated with difficulties tracking disease patterns,
treatment strategies, and prescription use. 190 Enhancing coordinated
care efforts among multiple providers generally leads to better health
outcomes for patients, 191 even on a global scale through the
burgeoning practice of telemedicine, or the exchange of medical data
via electronic means. 192 As electronic health records become more
accessible to individual patients (through patient health records),
patients will have a personal hand in streamlining their own medical
care in scheduling appointments, filling prescriptions, and
particularly managing chronic illness and disease. 193 Developed HIEs
can help individuals control, supervise, and manage their own
healthcare or the healthcare of an ailing child or elderly parent. 194
The widely acclaimed benefits of HIE enactment are reflected in
the increase of health exchanges in the United States. 195 A 2013
survey of almost 200 HIEs 196 revealed that health information
exchanges have increased 41% since 2008, and 58% of hospitals were
exchanging PHI with outside providers.

Hurricane Katrina. Catherine Arnst, The Best Medical Care in the U.S., BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, July 16, 2006, at 50, available at http://www.businessweek.com/stories/200607-16/the-best-medical-care-in-the-u-dot-s-dot.
188. Randolph C. Barrows, Jr. & Paul D. Clayton, Privacy, Confidentiality, and
Electronic Medical Records, 3 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 139, 146–147 (1996),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC116296/pdf/0030139.pdf.
189. Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of
Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 683 (2007).
190. See Amy M. Jurevic, When Technology and Health Care Collide: Issues with Electronic
Medical Records and Electronic Mail, 66 UMKC L. REV. 809, 810–11 (1998). See Terry &
Francis, supra note 189, at 683.
191. Terry & Francis, supra note 189, at 683.
192. Sao et al., supra note 146, at 59.
193. Leslie P. Francis, When Patients Interact with EHRs: Problems of Privacy and
Confidentiality, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 171, 175–76 (2012).
194. See id. at 175–76, 187.
195. See EHEALTH INITIATIVE, RESULTS FROM SURVEY ON HEALTH DATA EXCHANGE
2013, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.ehidc.org/resource-center/publications/
view_document/333.
196. This number included ninety community-based HIEs, forty-five state HIEs, and
fifty (Rule 6.2(a)) healthcare delivery organizations. Id.
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Despite the benefits, however, providers remain hesitant to
participate in HIEs. 197 Another 2013 survey of 119 HIEs found that
74% struggled to become financially sustainable, and 66% lacked
sufficient funding. 198 The healthcare community has been reluctant
to adopt information systems, and several HIE launches have failed,
including in Washington, D.C., Minnesota, the Appalachian region
(called CareSpark), 199 Kansas, 200 Tennessee, 201 and California. 202
These HIEs encountered similar barriers to implementation. For
example, HIE functionality is dependent on complete
interoperability between providers; two or more systems must be
willing to share and use data that has been exchanged. 203 This can be
technically complex—the variety of existing information systems can
obstruct data exchange—but does not present an insurmountable
barrier. 204 Similarly, HIE implementation costs are not precisely
known but likely high, which can be particularly challenging for
smaller practices and hospitals. 205 HIEs have failed for numerous
reasons, but PHI security remains the greatest concern for the
public206 despite widespread support of HIEs from healthcare
policymakers and legislators. 207

197. Gregg, supra note 18.
198. Id.; ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., supra note 18, at 51.
199. Genevieve Morris, et al., Query-Based Exchange: Key Factors Influencing Success and
Failure, HEALTHIT.GOV 15 (Sept. 30, 2012) (prepared for the Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information Technology), http://www.healthit.gov/sites/
default/files/query_based_exchange_ final.pdf.
200. Anthony Brino, Kansas HIE to Hand Over Authority to the State, HEALTHCARE IT
NEWS (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/kansas-hie-hand-overauthority-state.
201. Susan D. Hall, Tennessee HIE Organization Disbands, FIERCEHEALTHIT.COM (July
10, 2012), http://www.fiercehealthit.com/story/tennessee-hie-organization-disbands-stateopts-direct-project/2012-07-10.
202. John, RHIO Failure: CalRHIO Goes Belly-up, CHILMARK RES. (Jan. 18, 2010),
http://www.chilmarkresearch.com/2010/01/18/rhio-failure-calrhio-goes-belly-up/.
203. Gregg, supra note 18 (discussing the problems of too few participants, and the likely
resulting HIE failure, because “HIEs have to be a community effort”).
204. See Amar Gupta, Prescription for Change, WALL ST. J., available at http://online
.wsj.com/article/SB122426733527345133.html#printMode (last updated Oct. 20, 2008,
12:01 AM).
205. Yaffee, supra note 175, at 349.
206. XEROX 2012, supra note 143.
207. Sao et al., supra note 146, at 57.
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B. PHI Security in HIEs
HHS data suggests that traditional record-storing methods are
more prone to data breach than electronic formats and that HIEs
increase PHI security. As already discussed, since the Wall of Shame
began publicly reporting breaches, 48% of breaches arose from theft
incidents, and only 8% of incidents were linked to hacking, and only
3% of incidents involved electronic health record systems. 208
Furthermore, unlike paper records, electronic health record systems
automatically monitor and record PHI access, including digital
“footprints” marking the viewer’s identifying information and the
portions viewed of the patient record. 209 Encryption prevents
document alteration, and classified-viewer settings can prevent
unauthorized users from accessing portions of patient data. 210 Offsite storage technologies and vendors provide an additional layer of
data security and virtually eliminate data theft if properly stored. 211
These auditing and restrictive tactics are certainly more secure than
file cabinets kept in a locked basement, so long as they are
periodically updated, encrypted, and complex-password protected.
Indeed, such protective measures are not unlike those successfully
used in the finance industry. 212

208. McCormack, supra note 138.
209. Leon Rodriguez, Privacy, Security, and Electronic Health Records, HEALTH IT BUZZ
(Dec. 12, 2011, 10:24 am), http://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/privacy-and-security-of-ehrs
/privacy-security-electronic-health-records/ (“[I]f your data is seen by someone who should not
see it, federal law requires doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers to notify you of a ‘breach’
of your health information. This requirement helps patients know if something has gone wrong with
the protection of their information and helps keep providers accountable.”).
210. See generally CyberSecurity: 10 Best Practices for the Small Health Care Environment,
http://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/cybersecurity
(last
HEALTHIT.GOV,
updated Mar. 28, 2014) (discussing some of the methods of device protection and benefits of
encryption).
211. John Haughton, A Perspective On: Cloud-Based Modular EHRs Offer Advantages for
Meaningful Use, HIMSS Transforming Health Through IT, HIMSS (July 26, 2011), http://
www.himss.org/News/NewsDetail.aspx?ItemNumber=4052 (demonstrating that cloud-based
storage applications have long-protected sensitive information in various data-sensitive
industries).
212. This comparison has been widely explored in other scholarship, including in Sao et
al., supra note 146, at 64–66. To summarize, a financial institution “regularly stores and
transfers personal financial information across state and national borders in electronic form”
that is comparatively as secure and effective as HIE solutions. Id. The finance industry is
similarly complex to the HIPAA privacy regime—complete with analogous state and federal
requirements—and just as little understood. Despite legal and regulatory inadequacies,
however, the finance industry and consumers have accepted the electronic regulation of

1242

DO NOT DELETE

1213

5/22/2015 5:42 PM

The Creation of HIPAA Culture

In light of comparatively minor privacy concerns for HIEs, the
public and healthcare community’s reluctance to support HIE
implementation can be explained only by the pervasive HIPAA
culture. It seems likely that public education regarding these privacy
protections would alleviate these worries. In light of increased
security, improved care, and greater patient involvement associated
with HIE use, the institutional and publicized HIPAA culture–
induced fear of PHI sharing between appropriate providers is both
unfounded and illogical. To some degree, that paranoia is
understandable: it is a worrisome idea that, even theoretically,
hundreds or thousands of hospital employees across an HIE network
have ready access to millions of patient records. But patient privacy is
not only built into the HIE framework through auditing, restrictive
entry, and encryption methods; patient privacy is a fundamental
tenant of the Hippocratic Oath 213 and the American Medical
Association’s “Principles of Medical Ethics.” 214 Furthermore, in
possibly one of the only universally positive outcomes created from
HIPAA culture, any employee who knowingly and inappropriately
accesses and uses HIE patient records risks severe civil or even
criminal penalties. 215 By discouraging HIE use, HIPAA culture and
associated “privacy paranoia” costs the healthcare system billions of
dollars and severely hinders comprehensive, superior patient care.
C. Case Study in Houston, Texas: Greater Houston Healthconnect
During the summer of 2012, I worked in Houston for the
relatively new HIE Greater Houston Healthconnect. Healthconnect
launched in late 2011 after receiving a small HITECH grant from
the Texas Department of Health and Human Services. 216 The HIE
initially garnered support from sixty hospitals—nearly 80% of area

finances to remain competitive through convenience and adequate IT security. See id.
213. Hippocratic Oath: Modern Version, Bioethics, JOHN HOPKINS SHERIDAN LIBR.,
http://guides.library.jhu.edu/content.php?pid=23699&sid=190964 (last updated Aug. 28,
2014).
214. History of AMA Ethics, supra note 159.
215. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) of 1996, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320d-5 (2006).
216. Lora Hines, Sharing Health Info Vital Yet Lacking: Houston’s Healthconnect
Electronically Connecting Hospitals and Doctors, HOUS. CHRON., http://www.houstonchroni
cle.com/news/article/ Sharing-health-info-vital-yet-lacking-4647463.php (last updated July
4, 2013, 9:09 pm).
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hospitals 217—as well as more than 5,300 local physicians. 218
Currently, the Healthconnect HIE covers 20 counties, 14,000
physicians, 133 hospitals, and 7 million potential patients and
expects to be entirely self-sustainable by the end of 2014 through
participation fees from all participants—including physician offices,
hospitals, and federally qualified health centers, which largely serve
Medicaid populations. 219 The Texas Medical Center is the largest
medical center in the world with a very high density of clinical
facilities for science, research, and patient care. 220 Houston is,
theoretically, the ideal HIE location.
In addition to the concentrated medical expertise of the area,
HIE implementation should be less complicated in Houston than in
most other markets because Houston is an “opt-in” consent
system. 221 This means that patients have to consciously “opt-in” to
the exchange network, as opposed to most other HIE markets,
which automatically enroll patients concurrently with providers and
require patients to “opt-out” if desired. 222
Furthermore, unlike some other HIEs, Greater Houston
Healthconnect does not have a centralized data repository, which
means patient data is not stored in one large, accessible “vat”
maintained by the HIE authority. 223 In many centralized HIE
models, the HIE provides central authorities (often a state regulating
group) with unique patient identifying information and widespread
217. GREATER HOUSTIN HEALTHCONNECT, PRESS KIT 12 (2013) available at
http://hietexas.org/component/docman/doc_download/671-ghh-press-kit-october2013?Itemid=.
218. James Byers, Health Information Organization Changes Name, Announces New
CEO, BUSINESSWIRE.COM (Jan. 31, 2012, 11:32 am), http://www.businesswire.com
/news/home/20120131006346/en/Health-Information-Organization-AnnouncesCEO#.UyoLLBaRE3E.
219. fastFACTS, GREATER HOUSTON HEALTHCONNECT, http://ghhconnect.org/
index.html#/fast-facts/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
220. About TMC, TEXAS MEDICAL CENTER http://www.texasmedicalcenter.org/abouttmc/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
221. HIE Objectives, HIETEXAS, http://hietexas.org/resources/index.php?option=com
_content&view=article&id=170&Itemid=310 (last visited Aug. 29, 2014).
222. See Madelyn Young, Joining an HIE or RHIO? Navigate the Opt-In/Opt-Out
Decision Carefully, POWER YOUR PRACTICE, http://www.poweryourpractice.com/medicalpractice-resources/joining-an-hie-or-rhio-navigate-the-opt-inopt-out-decision-carefully/ (last
visited Sept. 2, 2014).
223. Jennifer Bresnick, Healthconnect HIE Takes Off in Texas with Vendor, Provider Help,
EHR INTELLIGENCE, May 2, 2013, http://ehrintelligence.com/2013/05/02/healthconnect
-hie-takes-off-in-texas-with-vendor-provider-help/.
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PHI access, or a theoretical “vat” of PHI. 224 Those with requisite
authority can access data at any time. 225 Healthconnect, however,
uses a federated model, 226 which means that Healthconnect’s
software vendor maintains patient data in isolated “silos” to separate
patient data between healthcare organizations. 227 This federated HIE
model stores PHI in remotely located repositories. 228 This means
that, with very limited exceptions, no one person has access to all
patient records, and no person can access or download all patient
records at once. Members of the Healthconnect HIE can retrieve
data through the “query and response” model: member
organizations send a “query” to the HIE patient registry, which
contains an internal patient information “map” searchable by unique
patient identifiers, including social security number, name, and other
input options. 229 When the query locates the proper medical record,
the HIE returns the record’s physical location and can request the
patient information from the storing organization. 230 The storing
organization can then transmit the data via secure e-mail or other
web services. 231 The centralized data repository can be more efficient
because it allows a single exchange of information but, by
incorporating one extra step, the federated model provides extra PHI
protection. 232
HIE implementation has been surprisingly difficult in Houston,
despite its concentration of individuals familiar with the current
information system’s shortcomings and with the potential for
financial growth and improved patient care through a communitywide electronic health record system. 233 Experience demonstrates the
pervasive HIPAA culture in Houston—arguably the most medically
sophisticated city in the world—is actively hindering best-practice

224. See HIE Technical Informational Overview, HIMSS.ORG 7 (March 2011), http://w
ww.himss.org/files/HIMSSorg/content/files/HIMSSHIETechnicalOverview.pdf/.
225. See id.
226. HIE Objectives, supra note 221.
227. See generally HIMSS, supra note 224.
228. Id. at 12–13.
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See generally id.
233. See About TMC, supra note 220.
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medicine in the community, and, by extrapolation, throughout the
country.
In May 2013, Greater Houston Healthconnect had only twentyeight contracts with providers and major health systems 234—the
letters of support from hospitals had, in most cases, not yet become
contractual relationships. The only effective data exchange was
occurring in far southeast Texas, where a few remote hospital systems
had signed up for the HIE. 235 Contracting with remote hospitals is
understandably less challenging for HIEs; those hospitals have the
most to gain, particularly financially, from a regional HIE.236
There are some partial explanations unrelated to HIPAA culture
for the Houston medical community’s hesitancy to install the HIE,
but these reasons cannot alone adequately explain Healthconnect’s
difficulties. From the sales pitch to going “live,” patient data
exchanges take six to twelve months or more to implement in larger
institutions. 237 Implementation involves technical interface
installation, which can take from twelve to twenty weeks depending
on the complexity of the already-existing interface. 238 Additionally,
Houston is a highly competitive medical market, and it is possible
administrators may hesitate to share data because they could lose
“customers” when they lose their exclusive technological
infrastructure. 239
Still, neither the technological nor unique competitive challenges
adequately explain the level of resistance to community HIE

234. Bresnick, supra note 223.
235. Greater Houston Healthconnect, Expansion of Greater Houston Healthconnect will
Enhance Coordination of Care Between Patients and Providers, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Mar.
6, 2012), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/press-release/expansion-greater-houston-health
connect-will-enhance-coordination-care-between-patient.
236. Benefits for Critical Access Hospitals and Other Small Rural Hospitals,
http://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/benefits-critical-accessHEALTHIT.GOV,
hospitals-and-other-small-rural-hospitals (last updated May 14, 2014).
237. Bresnick, supra note 223.
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., Carrie Feibel, Why Catholic Hospital Chain Wants in on the Houston
Market, HOUS. PUBLIC MEDIA (April 22, 2013, 3:11 PM), http://www.houstonpublicmedia
.org/news/1366643466/ (discussing generally hospital market competition in Houston);
Deborah White, Houston 2011 Market Overview, HEALTHLEADERS INTERSTUDY, http://hlisy.com/Products-and-Services/Market-Overviews/Southwest/2011/Houston-TX
(last
visited Sept. 2, 2014) (“Competition is heating up among leading health systems as they build
new hospitals and expand in suburban areas and in the Texas Medical Center, the largest
medical complex in the world.”).
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implementation. The medical community in Houston largely
supports the HIE, at least in theory, and prominent professionals
acknowledge its potential value, 240 but Healthconnect still receives
significant pushback as evidenced by the slow HIE implementation.
If healthcare organizations were more willing to sign contracts, IT
employees could more easily and more quickly move through the
technical execution. Furthermore, if organizational hesitancy were
simply due to the particular competitive Medical Center
environment, every local federally qualified health center (“FQHC”)
would have immediately signed up for the HIE. FQHCs are
generally underfunded and serve indigent, often uninsured or
Medicaid-insured patients—of which there are nearly 900,000 in the
greater Houston area 241—and competition is not a concern. Nor
have FQHCs been discouraged by the HIE cost; in early HIE stages,
many providers receive steeply discounted prices or even entirely
waived fees. Still relatively few FQHCs are participating. 242 Finding
an employee within a practice or hospital willing to champion the
HIE project is a continual challenge for Healthconnect.
The difficulties associated with the Healthconnect HIE
implementation demonstrate the negative side effects of HIPAA
culture: a public obsessed with PHI protection even at the expense
of better, more efficient, less expensive, more PHI-protective care. 243
Even among a health-educated community, doubtlessly aware of the
potential benefits of HIEs, 244 the HIPAA requirements and violation

240. Byers, supra note 218.
241. Final Count—Medicaid Enrollment by County—May 2013, TEX. HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES COMM’N, http://www.hhsc.state.tx.us/research/MedicaidEnrollment/
ME/201305.html (last accessed Sept. 2, 2014). Greater Houston Healthconnect serves the
Colorado, Wharton, Matagorda, Austin, Fort Bend, Harris, Walker, Brazoria, Galevston,
Waller, Montgomery, San Jacinto, Liberty, Chambers, Tyler, Hardin, Jefferson, Jasper,
Orange, and Newton counties, fastFACTS, supra note 219, which, according to that chart,
total 896,495 Medicaid enrollees. Final Count—Medicaid Enrollment by County—May 2013,
TEX. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMM’N, http://www.hhsc.state.tx.us
/research/MedicaidEnrollment/ME/201305.html (last accessed Sept. 2, 2014).
242. Harris County alone has 30 FQHCs. Greater Houston HEALTHCONNECT,
HARRIS COUNTY HEALTHCARE ALLIANCE, http://www.hchalliance.org/8-site-pages/146greater-houston-healthconnect.html (last accessed Sept. 2, 2014). In summer 2012 only two
FQHCs were in the final stages of HIE connection, though several others were contracted to
connect later. GREATER HOUS. HEALTHCONNECT, http://ghhconnect.org/#/connectedproviders—-physicians-and-community-health-providers/ (last accessed Sept. 2, 2014).
243. See, e.g., Sao et al., supra note 146, at 64–66.
244. See About TMC, supra note 220.
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penalties have educated both patients and providers to resist datasharing. The negative effects of this HIPAA culture are arguably
worsened in a medically saturated market and are hindering best
patient care practices.
D. Possible Solutions
Although suggesting fixes for the perception and education
problems relating to HIPAA culture privacy paranoia would require
a separate article, the very nature of HIE operations demonstrates
how solutions could potentially be realized.
As previously discussed, HIEs “have to be a community
effort.” 245 Many individual hospitals and medical practices utilize
their own electronic health record system but are unable to exchange
with providers outside that system without a common health
information exchange—thereby severely limiting the benefits of
hosting electronic data. 246 To provide the best patient care, providers
must “‘be able to look at the whole [healthcare] community and see
every place the patient has been seen’ to be able to devise the best
course of action for the patient’s care.” 247 This includes a treating
physician’s ability to instantaneously extract cumulative patient data
and create a treatment plan. 248
The only way to implement HIEs and create this continuum of
patient care is through mass enrollment. 249 More participating
providers will drive down the overall cost of participation and
increase the value of enrollment through greater quantities of
potentially exchanged patient data. 250 Greater enrollment must be
encouraged through a whole community effort to reeducate
physicians and the general public regarding PHI protection.
Given the unlikelihood of successful legislative reform and in
light of the significant benefits of HIEs, a better understanding of

245. Gregg, supra note 18.
246. See, e.g., id. (“[The Tennessee HIE OnePartner is] a physician-owned HIE that
connects more than 700 regional physicians from 14 physician practices. [Individual] practices
use a variety of electronic health record platforms and are affiliated with different hospitals, but
they are able to find and share patient information on the common exchange.”).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. (“‘HIEs are expensive . . . If you’re trying to make one for a group of less than
200 or 250 doctors, it’s probably prohibitively expensive.’”).
250. Id.
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PHI protection and the increased safety of HIEs over other PHI
storage methods would substantially curb HIPAA culture.
Widespread enactment of basic privacy training 251—including
encryption, complicated password creation, and theft avoidance
techniques—could effectively protect PHI, comply with HIPAA
requirements, and encourage increased HIE implementation. 252
Because of the expressive effect of the statute and its sanctions, the
best way to effectively counter HIPAA culture without re-writing the
statute itself is to contrast that PHI-sharing phobia with educational
efforts highlighting the increased protections and advantages of PHI
storage and sharing within HIEs.
V. CONCLUSION
The expressive effects of the HIPAA statute and the associated
HHS regulations have resulted in HIPAA culture: a public educated
only in privacy paranoia at the cost of better health care. HIPAA
culture is associated with hindered patient care, a “compliance” over
“PHI protection” mindset among healthcare entities, and millions, if
not billions, of lost dollars from repeated tests, wasted administrative
time, and poor patient tracking. Given this current mentality, the
challenges associated with the Houston HIE implementation are
hardly surprising. Though Houston has every indication of potential
HIE success—a more protective, federated storage model; a more
medically sophisticated population; widespread spoken, if not
enacted, support; and an “opt-in” consent requirement—HIPAA
culture has significantly slowed HIE enactment and has thereby
harmed patient care, both in Houston and, by extrapolation,
nationwide.
Jessica Jardine Wilkes*

251. The statute already requires employee training but does not include
recommendations regarding encryption, password complexity, or other basic privacy measures.
45 C.F.R. § 164.530(b), (e) (2013) (“A covered entity must train all members of its workforce on
the policies and procedures with respect to protected health information required by this
subpart and subpart D of this part, as necessary and appropriate for the members of the
workforce to carry out their functions within the covered entity.”).
252. See McCormack, supra note 136.
* J.D., April 2014, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
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